We study side-channel attacks for the Shannon cipher system. To pose side channel-attacks to the Shannon cipher system, we regard them as a signal estimation via encoded data from two distributed sensors. This can be formulated as the one helper source coding problem posed and investigated by Ahlswede, Körner(1975), and Wyner(1975) . We further investigate the posed problem to derive new secrecy bounds. Our results are derived by a coupling of the result Watanabe and Oohama(2012) obtained on bounded storage evasdropper with the exponential strong converse theorem Oohama (2015) established for the one helper source coding problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider the problem of strengthening the security of communication in the Shannon cipher system when we have side channel attacks to the cryptosystem. Especially, we are interested on practical solutions with minimum modifications which can be applied even on already running systems.
More precisely, we consider a cryptosystem described as follows: a source X is encrypted in a node to C using secret key K. The cipher text C is sent through a public communication channel to a sink node, where X is decrypted from C using K. We suppose that an already running system has a potential secrecy/privacy problem such that X might be leaked to an adversary which is eavesdropping the public communication channel and is also using a side-channel providing some side information on K.
To pose side channel-attacks to the Shannon cipher system, we regard them as a signal estimation via encoded data from two distributed sensors. This can be formulated as the one helper source coding problem posed and investigated by Ahlswede, Körner [1] and Wyner [2] .
We further investigate the posed problem to derive new secrecy bounds. Our results are derived by two previous results. One is the coding theorem Watanebe and Oohama [3] obtained for the privacy amplification problem for bounded storage eavesdropper posed by them. The other is the exponential strong converse theorem Oohama [4] established for the one helper source coding problem.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Preliminaries
In this subsection, we show the basic notations and related consensus used in this paper.
Random Source of Information and Key:
Let X be a random variable from a finite set X . Let {X t } ∞ t=1 be a stationary discrete memoryless source(DMS) such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., X t takes values in finite set X and obeys the same distribution as that of X denoted by p X = {p X (x)} x∈X . The stationary DMS {X t } ∞ t=1 is specified with p X . Also, let K be a random variable taken from the same finite set X representing the key used for encryption. Similarly, let {K t } ∞ t=1 be a stationary discrete memoryless source such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., K t takes values in the finite set X and obeys the same distribution as that of K denoted by p K = {p K (k)} k∈X . The stationary DMS {K t } ∞ t=1 is specified with p K . In this paper we assume that p K is the uniform distribution over X . Random Variables and Sequences: We write the sequence of random variables with length n from the information source as follows: X n := X 1 X 2 · · · X n . Similarly, the strings with length n of X n are written as x n := x 1 x 2 · · · x n ∈ X n . For x n ∈ X n , p X n (x n ) stands for the probability of the occurrence of x n . When the information source is memoryless specified with p X , we have the following equation holds: p X n (x n ) = n t=1 p X (x t ).
In this case we write p X n (x n ) as p n X (x n ). Similar notations are used for other random variables and sequences. Consensus and Notations: Without loss of generality, throughout this paper, we assume that X is a finite field. The notation ⊕ is used to denote the field addition operation, while the notation ⊖ is used to denote the field subtraction operation, i.e., a ⊖ b = a ⊕ (−b) for any elements a, b ∈ X . Throughout this paper all logarithms are taken to the base natural.
B. Basic System Description
In this subsection we explain the basic system setting and basic adversarial model we consider in this paper. First, let the information source and the key be generated independently by different parties S gen and K gen respectively. In our setting, we assume the followings.
• The random key K n is generated by K gen from uniform distribution. • The source is generated by S gen and independent of the key. Next, let the random source X n from S gen be sent to the node L. And let the random key K n from K gen be also sent to L. Further settings of our system are described as follows. Those are also shown in Fig. 1 . 1) Source Processing: At the node , X n is encrypted with the key K n using the encryption function Enc. The ciphertext C n of X n is given by
2) Transmission: Next, the ciphertext C n is sent to the information processing center D through a public communication channel. Meanwhile, the key K n is sent to D through a private communication channel. 3) Sink Node Processing: In D, we decrypt the ciphertext C n using the key K n through the corresponding decryption procedure Dec defined by Dec(C n ) = C n ⊖ K n . It is obvious that we can correctly reproduce the source output X n from C n and K n by the decryption function Dec.
Side-Channel Attacks by Eavesdropper Adversary:
An (eavesdropper) adversary A eavesdrops the public communication channel in the system. The adversary A also uses a side information obtained by side-channel attacks. In this paper we introduce a new theoretical model of side-channel attacks, which is described as follows. Let Z be a finite set and let W : X → Z be a noisy channel. Let Z be a channel output from W for the input random variable K. We consider the discrete memoryless channel specified with W . Let Z n ∈ Z n be a random variable obtained as the channel output by connecting K n ∈ X n to the input of channel. We write a conditional distribution on Z n given K n as W n = {W n (z n |k n )} (k n ,z n )∈K n ×Z n .
Since the channel is memoryless, we have
On the above output Z n of W n for the input K n , we assume the followings.
• The three random variables X, K and Z, satisfy X ⊥ (K, Z), which implies that X n ⊥ (K n , Z n ). • W is given in the system and the adversary A can not control W . • By side-channel attacks, the adversary A can access Z n . We next formulate side information the adversary A obtains by side-channel attacks. For each n = 1, 2, · · · , let ϕ (n)
On encoded side information the adversary A obtains we assume the following.
• For each n = 1, 2, · · · , the adversary A can design ϕ
n=1 must be upper bounded by a prescribed value. In other words, the adversary A must use ϕ
(n)
A such that for some R A and for any sufficiently large n, ϕ
• The adversary A, having accessed Z n , obtains the encoded additional information ϕ (n)
A (Z n ).
C. Proposed Idea: Affine Encoder as Privacy Amplifier
For each n = 1, 2, · · · , let φ (n) : X n → X m be a linear mapping. We define the mapping φ (n) by
where A is a matrix with n rows and m columns. Entries of A are from X . We fix b m ∈ X m . Define the mapping ϕ (n) : X n → X m by
The mapping ϕ (n) is called the affine mapping induced by the linear mapping φ (n) and constant vector b m ∈ X m . By the definition (3) of ϕ (n) , those satisfy the following affine structure:
Next, let ψ (n) be the corresponding decoder for φ (n) such that ψ (n) : X m → X n . Note that ψ (n) does not have a linear structure in general.
Description of Proposed Procedure: We describe the procedure of our privacy amplified system as follows. 1) Encoding of Ciphertext: First, we use ϕ (n) to encode the ciphertext C n = X n ⊕ K n Let C m = ϕ (n) (C n ). Then, instead of sending C n , we sendC m to the public communication channel. By the affine structure (4) of encoder we have that
where we set X m := φ (n) (X n ), K m := ϕ (n) (K n ).
2) Decoding at Sink Node D:
First, using the linear encoder ϕ (n) , D encodes the key K n received through private channel into K m =(ϕ (n) (K n ). Receiving C m from public communication channel, D computes X m in the following way. From (5) , we have that the decoder D can obtain X m = φ (n) (X n ) by subtracting K m = ϕ (n) (K n ) from C m . Finally, D outputs X n by applying the decoder ψ (n) to X m as follows:
Our privacy amplified system described above is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
On Reliability: From the description of our system in the previous section, the decoding process in our system above is successful if X n = X n holds. Combining this and (6), it is clear that the decoding error probability p e is as follows:
On Security: Set M (n)
The adversary A tries to estimate X n ∈ X n from
The information leakage ∆ (n) on X n from ( C m , M (n) A ) is measured by the mutual information between X n and ( C m , M (n) A ). This quantity is formally defined by
Reliable and Secure Framework:
Definition 1: A quantity R is achievable under R A > 0 for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ (n) , ψ (n) )} n≥1 such that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃n 0 = n 0 (ǫ) ∈ N 0 , ∀n ≥ n 0 , we have
A |p n X , p n K , W n ) ≤ ǫ. Definition 2: (Reliable and Secure Rate Region) Let R Sys (p X , p K , W ) denote the set of all (R A , R) such that R is achievable under R A . We call R Sys (p X , p K , W ) the reliable and secure rate region.
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕ A satisfying ϕ
Definition 4: (Rate Reliability and Security Region) Let
the rate reliability and security region.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we state our main results. To describe our results we define several functions and sets. Let U be an auxiliary random variable taking values in a finite set U. We assume that the joint distribution of (U, Z, K) is
The above condition is equivalent to U ↔ Z ↔ K. Define the set of probability distribution p = p UZK by
We can show that the region R(p K , W ) satisfies the following property.
Property 1:
The minimun is attained by (R A , R) = (0, H(K)). This result implies that
Furthermore, the point (0, H(K)) always belongs to R(p K , W ). Property 1 part a) is a well known property. Proof of Property 1 part b) is easy. Proofs of Property 1 parts a) and b) are omitted.
Our result on R Sys (p X , p K , W ) is the following:
where cl [R c (p K , W )] stands for the closure of the complement of R(p K , W ). This theorem is proved by several techniques Watanabe and Oohama developed for establishing the direct part of privacy amplification theorem for bounded storage eavesdropper posed by them. We omit the detail. The privacy amplification for bounded storage eavesdropper has some interesting duality with the one helper source coding problem posed and investigated by Ashlswede and Körner [1] and Wyner [2] .
We next define several quantities to state a result on R Sys (p X , p K , W ). We first define a function related to an exponential upper bound of p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ). Let X be an arbitrary random variable over X and has a probability distribution p X . Let P(X ) denote the set of all probability distributions on X . For R ≥ 0 and p X ∈ P(X ), we define the following function:
We next define a function related to an exponential upper bound of
For µ ∈ [0, 1], β, α ≥ 0, and for q = q UZK ∈ Q(p K|Z ), define
,
We next define a function serving as a lower bound of
Furthermore, set
We can show that the above functions satisfies the following property.
.
where g is the inverse function of ϑ(a) := a + (3/2)a 2 , a ≥ 0.
Proof of this property is found in Oohama [4] (extended version). Our main result is as follows.
Theorem 2: For any R A , R > 0, and any (p K , W ), there exists a sequence of mappings {(ϕ (n) , ψ (n) )} ∞ n=1 such that for
where δ i,n , i = 1, 2 are defined by
Note that for i = 1, 2, δ i,n → 0 as n → ∞. This theorem is proved by a coupling of techniques Watanabe and Oohama [3] developed for establishing the direct part of privacy amplification theorem for bounded storage eavesdropper posed by them with those Oohama [4] developed for establishing exponential strong converse theorem for the one helper source coding problem.
The functions E(R|p X ) and F (R A , R|p K , W ) take positive values if and only if (R A , R) belongs to the set
Here int[R] stands for the set of inner points of R. Thus, by Theorem 2, under
we have the followings:
• On the reliability, p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function E(R|p X ). • On the security, for any ϕ A satisfying ϕ (n)
A |p n X , p n K , W n ) on X n goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function F (R A , R|p K , W ). • The code that attains the exponent functions E( R|p X )
is the universal code that depends only on R not on the value of the distribution p X . Define
From Theorem 2, we immediately obtain the following corollary. Fig. 3 .
IV. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
In this section we prove Theorem 2.
A. Types of Sequences and Their Properties
In this subsection we prepare basic results on the types. Those results are basic tools for our analysis of several bounds related to error provability of decoding or security.
Definition 5: For any n-sequence x n = x 1 x 2 · · · x n ∈ X n , n(x|x n ) denotes the number of t such that x t = x. The relative frequency {n(x|x n )/n} x∈X of the components of x n is called the type of x n denoted by P x n . The set that consists of all the types on X is denoted by P n (X ). Let X denote an arbitrary random variable whose distribution P X belongs to P n (X ). For p X ∈ P n (X ), set T n X := {x n : P x n = p X } . For set of types and joint types the following lemma holds. For the detail of the proof see Csiszár and Körner [5] .
Lemma 1: a) |P n (X )| ≤ (n + 1) |X | . b) For P X ∈ P n (X ), (n + 1) −|X | e nH(X) ≤ |T n X | ≤ e nH(X) . c) For x n ∈ T n X , p n X (x n ) = e −n[H(X)+D(p X ||pX )] .
By Lemma 1 parts b) and c), we immediately obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2:
For p X ∈ P n (X ),
B. Upper Bounds of p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ) and ∆ n (ϕ (n) , ϕ (n) A |p n X , p n K , W n ) In this subsection we evaluate upper bounds of p e ( φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ) and ∆ n (ϕ (n) , ϕ (n)
A |p n X , p n K , W n ). For p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ), we derive an upper bound which can be characterized with a quantity depending on (φ (n) , ψ (n) ) and type P x n of sequences x n ∈ X n . We first evaluate p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ). For x n ∈ X n and p X ∈ P n (X ) we define the following functions.
Then we have the following lemma. Lemma 3: In the proposed system, for any pair of (φ (n) , ψ (n) ), we have
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from the definition of Ξ x n (φ (n) , ψ (n) ).
Step (b) follows from that the probabilities p n X (x n ) for x n ∈ T n X take an identical value.
Step (c) follows from the definition of Ξ X (φ (n) , ψ (n) ).
Step (d) follows from lemma 2. We next discuss upper bounds of
On an upper bound of I( C m , M
(n)
A ; X n ), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4:
where p V m represents the uniform distribution over X m . Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from X n ⊥ M (n) A .
Step (b) follows from C m = K m ⊕ X m and X m = φ (n) (X n ).
Step (c) follows from ( K m , M (n) A ) ⊥ X n .
C. Random Coding Arguments
We construct a pair of affine encoders ϕ (n) = (ϕ (n) 1 , ϕ (n) e ) using the random coding method. For the joint decoder ψ (n) , we propose the minimum entropy decoder used in Csiszár [6] and Oohama and Han [7] . Random Construction of Affine Encoders: We first choose m such that
where ⌊a⌋ stands for the integer part of a. It is obvious that
By the definition (2) of φ (n) , we have that for x n ∈ X n ,
where A is a matrix with n rows and m columns. By the definition (3) of ϕ (n) , we have that for k n ∈ X n ,
where b m is a vector with m columns. Entries of A and b m are from the field of X . Those entries are selected at random, independently of each other and with uniform distribution. Randomly constructed linear encoder φ (n) and affine encoder ϕ (n) have three properties shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Properties of Linear/Affine Encoders):
a) For any x n , v n ∈ X n with x n = v n , we have
b) For any s n ∈ X n , and for any s m ∈ X m , we have
c) For any s n , t n ∈ X n with s n = t n , and for any s m ∈ X m , we have
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. We next define the decoder function ψ (n) : X m → X n . To this end we define the following quantities.
Definition 6: For x n ∈ X n , we denote the entropy calculated from the type P x n by H(x n ). In other words, for a type P X ∈ P n (X ) such that P X = P x n , we define H(x n ) = H(X).
Minimum Entropy Decoder:
For φ (n) (x n ) = x m , we define the decoder function ψ (n) : X m → X n as follows:
for allx n such that φ (n) (x n ) = x m , andx n = x n , arbitrary if there is no such x n ∈ X n .
Error Probability Bound: In the following arguments we let expectations based on the random choice of the affine encoder ϕ (n) be denoted by E[·]. Define
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: For any n and for any P X ∈ P n (X ),
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix B.
Estimation of Approximation Error: Define
Then we have the following lemma. Lemma 7:
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix C. From the bound (15) in Lemma (7) , we know that the quantity Θ(R, ϕ (n)
A |p K n , W n ) serves as an upper bound of the ensemble average of the conditional divergence D(pK m |M (n)
). Hayashi [8] obtained the same upper bound of the ensemble average of the conditional divergence for an ensemble of universal 2 functions. In this paper we prove the bound (15) for an ensemble of affine encoders. To derive this bound we need to use Lemma 5 parts b) and c), the two important properties which a class of random affine encoders satisfies. From Lemmas 4 and 7, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2:
D. Explicit Upper Bound of Θ(R, ϕ (n)
A |p n K , W n ) In this subsection we derive an explicit upper bound of Θ(R, ϕ (n)
A (R A ). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 8: For any η > 0 and for any eavesdropper A with ϕ A satisfying ϕ (n)
Proof: We first observe that
We further observe the following:
Step (a) follows from (m/n) log |X | ≤ R.
Step (b) follows from log(1 + a) ≤ a. We also note that
Step (a) follows from (m/n) log |X | ≤ R. From (17), (18), (19), we have the bound (16) in Lemma 8. Lemma 9: For any η > 0 and for any eavesdropper A with ϕ A satisfying ϕ (n)
The probability distributions appearing in the two inequalities (20) and (21) in the right members of (22) have a property that we can select them arbitrary. In (20), we can choose any probability distributionq M (n) A Z n K n on M
(n)
A ×Z n ×X n . In (21), we can choose any distribution q Z n on Z n .
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix D. The upper bound (22) of (nR) −1 Θ(R, ϕ (n) A |p n K , W n ) in Lemma 9 is the same as that of the correct probability of decoding for one helper source coding problem in Lemma 1 in Oohama [4] (extended version). In a manner similar to the derivation of the exponential upper bound of the correct probability of decoding for one helper source coding problem we can derive the same exponential upper bound of (nR) −1 Θ(R, ϕ (n) A |p n K , W n ). This result is shown in the following proposition.
From Corollary 2 and Propostion 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3: For any ϕ
(n) A ∈ F (n) A (R A ), we have E ∆ n (ϕ (n) , ϕ (n) A |p n X , p n K , W n ) ≤ 5nRe −nF (RA,R|pK ,W ) .
E. Proof of Theorem 2
In this subsection we prove Theorem 2 using the results we have obtained in the previous subsections.
Existence of Good Universal Code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ):
From Lemma 6 and Corollary 3, we have the following lemma stating an existence of good universal code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ).
Lemma 10: There exists at least one deterministic code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ) satisfying (m/n) log |X | ≤ R, such that for any p X ∈ P n (X ),
Furthermore, for any ϕ (n)
A |p n X , p n K , W n ) ≤ 5nR{(n + 1) |X | + 1}e −nF (RA,R|pK ,W ) .
Proof:
We have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from Lemma 6 and Corollary 3.
Step (b) follows from Lemma 1 part a). Hence there exists at least one deterministic code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ) such that
from which we have that
for any p X ∈ P n (X ). Furthermore, we have that for any ϕ (n)
A |p n X , p n K , W n ) 5nRe −nF (RA,R|pK ,W ) ≤ (n + 1) |X | + 1, completing the proof. Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemma 10, there exists (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ) satisfying (m/n) log |X | ≤ R, such that for any p X ∈ P n (X ),
Furthermore for any ϕ (n)
The bound (9) in Theorem 2 has already been proved in (25).
Hence it suffices to prove the bound (8) in Theorem 2 to complete the proof. On an upper bound of p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |p n X ), we have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from Lemma 3 and (24).
Step (b) follows from Lemma 1 part a).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: Let a m l be the l-th low vector of the matrix A. For each l = 1, 2, · · · , n, let A m l ∈ X m be a random vector which represents the randomness of the choice of a m l ∈ X m . Let B m ∈ X m be a random vector which represent the randomness of the choice of b m ∈ X m . We first prove the part a). Without loss of generality we may assume x 1 = v 1 . Under this assumption we have the following:
Computing Pr[φ(x n ) = φ(v n )], we have the following chain of equalities:
Step (a) follows from (26).
Step (b) follows from that n random vecotors A m l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n are independent. We next prove the part b). We have the following:
Computing Pr[s n A ⊕ b m = s m ], we have the following chain of equalities:
Step (a) follows from (27).
Step (b) follows from that n random vecotors A m l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and B m are independent. We finally prove the part c). We first observe that s n = t n ⇔ is equivalent to s i = t i for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Without loss of generality, we may assume that s 1 = t 1 . Under this assumption we have the following:
Computing
we have the following chain of equalities:
Step (a) follows from (28).
Step (b) follows from the independent property on A m l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and B m .
B. Proof of Lemma 6
For simplicity of notation, we write M = |X | m Proof of Lemma 6: For x n ∈ X n we set
Using parts a) and b) of Lemma 1, we have following inequalities:
On an upper bound of E[Ξ x n (φ (n) , ψ (n) )], we have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from Lemma 5 part a) and independent random constructions of linear encoders φ 
Hence we have
≤ e(n + 1) |X | e −n[R−H(X)] + , completing the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 7
In this appendix we prove Lemma 7. We define
Then, the conditional distribution of the random variablẽ K m =K m ϕ (n) for given M
The conditional divergence between pK m ϕ (n) |M (n) A and p V m for given M
Proof of Lemma 7: Taking expaction of both side of (30) with respect to the random choice of the entry of the matrix A and the vector b m representing the affine encoder ϕ (n) , we have
To compute (31), we use the following equations with respect to the probability measure based on the random choice of the matrix A and the vector b m representing the affine encoder ϕ (n) :
We also use the following equations:
for k n ∈ X n .
Using (32) and (33), we compute the expectation in the right member of (31) to obtain the following: 
Step (a) follows from Lemma 5 part b). From (34), we further compute the expectation to obtain the following: 
Step (a) follows from Jensen's inequality.
Step (b) follows from that by Lemma 5 parts b) and c), we have Pr ϕ (n) (ǩ n ) =k m ϕ (n) (k n ) =k m = Pr ϕ (n) (ǩ n ) = ϕ (n) (k n ) =k m Pr ϕ (n) (k n ) =k m = 1 |X | m .
D. Proof of Lemma 9
To prove Lemma 9, we prepare a lemma. For simplicity of notation, set |M (n) A | = M A . Define B n := (a, z n , k n ) :
1 n log p M (n) A Z n K n (a, z n , k n ) q M (n) A Z n K n (a, z n , k n ) ≥ −η .
Furthermore, definẽ C n := z n : 1 n log p Z n (z n ) q Z n (z n ) ≥ −η , C n :=C n × M (n)
A × X n , C c n :=B c n × M (n)
A × X n , D n := {(a, z n ) : a = ϕ (n) A (z n ), p Z n |M (n) A (z n |a) ≤ M A e nη p Z n (z n )}, D n :=D n × X n , D c n :=D c n × X n , E n := {(a, z n , k n ) : a = ϕ (n) A (z n ), p K n |M (n) A (k n |a) ≥ e −n(R+η) }, Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 11:
Proof: We first prove the first inequality.
p M (n) A Z n K n (B c n ) = (a,z n ,k n )∈B c n p M (n) A Z n K n (a, z n , k n ) Step (a) follows from the definition of A n . On the second inequality we have p M (n) A Z n K n (C c n ) = p Z n (C c n ) =
x n ∈C c n p Zn (z n ) (a) ≤ x n ∈C c n e −nη q Z n (z n ) = e −nη q Z n C c n ≤ e −nη .
